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Out of the Quandary: Personal Jurisdiction Over
Absent Class Member Claims Explained
A. Benjamin Spencert
ABSTRACT
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, litigants
and lower courts have wrestled with the issue of whether a federal
court must be able to exercise personal jurisdiction with respect to
each of the claims asserted by absent class members in a class action
and, if so, what standard governs that jurisdictional determination.
This issue is rapidly coming to a head and is poised for inevitable
resolution by the Supreme Court in the near future; multiple circuit
courts have heard appeals from district courts that have reached
varying conclusions on this point.
To provide guidance, both to the circuit courts facing this issue
as well as to the Supreme Court once it is squarely presented with the
question, this Article provides the proper analysis that courts should
employ concerning the ability of federal courts to adjudicate the
claims of absent class members. To wit: A federal court's authority to
render a binding judgment against a defendant is currently
constrained-by rule-to be coterminous with that of the courts of
general jurisdiction in the fora in which they are located. Such
constraints-which emanate from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment-mandate that the claims of absent members
of a certified class must either arise out of or be related to the
defendant's contacts with the forum, or be brought in a forum in which
the defendant could be subjected to general jurisdiction. Prior to class
certification, the claims of absent class members are not properly
before the court and thus are not subject to dismissal; however, in
anticipation of the requirement that only those class members whose
claims can satisfy applicable Fourteenth Amendment standards may
properly be included within the definition of the class that is certified,
tBennett Boskey Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Justice Thurgood
Marshall Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
The author is also a member of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee of the Judicial
Conference of the United States. The views expressed in this Article are his own and
do not represent official views of the Civil Rules Committee.
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a district court may strike from the complaint the allegations
pertaining to the claims of absent class members who will be unable
to meet these standards in response to a motion to strike. Or, as an
alternative to that approach, defendants may opt to urge the district
court to limit the definition of the certified class to the claims of
absentees that meet Fourteenth Amendment constraints. To the extent
the court certifies a class that includes the claims of absent class
members that do not meet these constraints, the defendant may appeal
the certification decision on that ground.
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................... 31
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 32
I. THE JURIDICAL STATUS OF UNNAMED CLASS MEMBERS
AND THEIR CLAIMS IN A PUTATIVE CLASS ACTION .. 35
II.DETERMINING A COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER THE
CLAIMS OF ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS UPON CLASS
CERTIFICATION .................................................................. 39
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C. The Fourteenth Amendment Standard ............................. 47
III.APPLYING THE CONSTRAINT: HOW COURTS MAY
ENFORCE THE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR TERRITORIAL
REACH OVER THE CLAIMS OF ABSENT CLASS
MEMBERS............................................................................. 49
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 51
INTRODUCTION
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California,
San Francisco County, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a California
state court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant based on the claims of non-California residents that did not
arise out of and were not related to the California contacts of that
defendant. 1 Because Bristol-Myers involved a nationwide mass action
directly filed in a California state court by the non-residents
themselves, the Court's decision did not touch on the question of
I. 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) ("In order for a court to exercise specific
jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an 'affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place
in the forum State."' (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915,919 (2011))) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
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whether state-court limits on personal jurisdiction applied to the
claims of unnamed class members not injured in the forum, 2 nor did
its decision address whether the Fifth Amendment imposed similar
restrictions on federal courts. 3
The lower courts have quickly confronted the issues left open
in Bristol-Myers, reaching varying results. Molock v. Whole Foods
Market Group, Inc. , is a putative class action filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia by past and present employees
seeking wages they claimed were owed to them but not paid. 4 Named
class representatives included employees whose claims were not based
on any conduct occurring within the District of Columbia, and the
proposed class included persons whose claims had no connection with
the forum. The district court dismissed the claims of the class
representatives whose claims were not connected to D.C., but declined
to exclude the unnamed putative class members whose claims were
not connected to D.C., stating, "the court joins the other courts that
have concluded that Bristol-Myers does not require a court to assess
personal jurisdiction with regard to all non-resident putative class
members."5 On September 25, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit heard argument in the appeal of the district court's
decision in the case.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has
reached a contrary result. In Mussat v. IQVIA Inc., the plaintiff (an
Illinois citizen) sued the defendant (a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Pennsylvania) in Illinois federal court
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), seeking to
represent a geographically unrestricted, putative class of individuals
with similar claims. 6 The district court granted the defendant's motion
to strike the claims of the non-Illinois absent class members from the
definition of the class on the ground that applicable Fourteenth
Amendment due process limitations "require[] a connection between
the forum and the specific claims at issue" and "bars nationwide class
2. Id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("The Court today does not
confront the question whether its opinion here would also apply to a class action in
which a plaintiff injured in the forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class of
plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured there.").
3. Id. at 1783-84 ("In addition, since our decision concerns the due process
limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question
whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of
personal jurisdiction by a federal court.").
4. 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120--21 (D.D.C. 2018).
5. Id. at 127.
6. No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903, at *l (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018).
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actions in fora where the defendant is not subject to general
jurisdiction."7 On September 27, 2019, the Seventh Circuit heard
argument in the appeal of the district court's decision in the case. 8
Given the importance of the class action device and the need
for courts to know whether plaintiffs may bring nationwide class
actions in a given jurisdiction, it is critical to resolve the question of
whether federal courts 9 may exercise personal jurisdiction over
defendants with respect to the claims of unnamed class members 10
whose claims are unconnected with the forum. In what follows, this
Article will supply the doctrinal analysis that answers this question
and provide guidance to courts regarding how they should proceed
when such questions arise.

7. Id. at *5 (citing Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780-81).
8. An additional case is headed for appellate review in the Fifth Circuit-an
appeal of the decision in Cruson v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 4:16-CV-00912,
2018 WL 2937471, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Tex. June 12, 2018), in which the district court
held that the defendant waived its personal jurisdiction challenge with respect to the
claims of unnamed class members by not raising that objection until the class
certification stage. Because of the court's waiver decision, the defendant's
arguments under Bristol-Myers were not considered, and thus, the question
addressed by this Article-the applicability of that case to class actions-may not
be addressed by the circuit court.
9. This Article will confine itself to a discussion of the authority of federal
courts to render binding judgments respecting the claims of absent class members,
because it is in that context that the question most immediately presents itself in the
cases mentioned, which are those most likely to immanently reach the U.S. Supreme
Court. However, it is highly likely that the ability of state courts to render binding
judgm ents over such claims will be constrained to a similar-if not greater--extent.
10. This Article need not thoroughly examine the question of whether a court
must have personal jurisdiction over the claims of named class members and, if so,
what standard should be applied. That question is manifestly resolved with reference
to Bristol-Myers. Named plaintiffs must assert claims that have a connection with
the forum to comport with due process. This is, in effect, the judgment reached by
the district court in Molock. 297 F. Supp. 3d at 126 ("Here, fairness to Defendants
counsels against exercising personal jurisdiction over the claims of [named class
representatives], which simply have nothing to do with this forum. Accordingly, the
claims of [named class representatives] against Defendants are dismissed for lack of
specific personal jurisdiction."). See also Spratley v. FCA US LLC, 3: l 7-CV-0062,
2017 WL 4023348, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) ("[I]n this case, the out-of-state
[named] Plaintiffs have shown no connection between their claims and Chrysler's
contacts with New York. Therefore, the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over the
out-of-state Plaintiffs' claims."). Cf. Roy v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 353
F. Supp. 3d 43, 56 (D. Mass. 2018) ("[T]his court ultimately does not find persuasive
Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish this case from Bristol-Myers on the basis that it is
an FLSA collective action in federal court.").
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I. THE JURIDICAL STATUS OF UNNAMED CLASS
MEMBERS AND THEIR CLAIMS IN A PUTATIVE CLASS
ACTION

The starting point in this analysis is to specify the status of the
absent members of a putative class and their claims. This is a vital first
step because when a complaint is initially filed by a class
representative on behalf of a class, whether the court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over the claims of absent class members against
the defendant depends on whether the absent class members and their
claims are considered to be before that court. This issue has been
articulated-unfortunately in my view-as turning on whether absent
class members are considered "parties" in the action. In Devlin v.
Scardel/etti, the Supreme Court stated that "[n]onnamed class
members, however, may be parties for some purposes and not for
others. The label 'party' does not indicate an absolute characteristic,
but rather a conclusion about the applicability of various procedural
rules that may differ based on context." 11 In what contexts has the
Court engaged in this analysis and what can that tell us about absent
class members' status for purposes of personal jurisdiction?
In the context of the diversity jurisdiction analysis for class
actions, the Supreme Court has embraced seemingly divergent
approaches. With respect to determining the amount in controversy in
a class action, the Court has held that the claim of each class
member-whether named or unnamed-must satisfy the amount-in
controversy requirement of the diversity statute-28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). 12 Further, the Court has held that where one class member's
claim satisfies that requirement, the insufficient claims of other class
members may not be aggregated to the sufficient claim to reach the
jurisdictional amount. 13 However, when assessing diversity of
citizenship for class actions, the Court has indicated that the
citizenship of only the named class representatives is to be taken into
11. 536 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2002).
12. Snyder v. Harris,394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) ("When two or more plaintiffs,
having separate and distinct demands,unite for convenience and economy in a single
suit,it is essential that the demand of each b e of the requisite jurisdictional amount."
(quoting Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead& Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911))).
13. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291,301 (1973) ("Each p laintiff in a Rule
23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who
does not must be dismissed from the case-'one plaintiff may not ride in on
another's coattails."' (quoting Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir.
1972))).
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account. 14 These varying treatments of absent class members and their
claims have been regarded--even by the Supreme Court itself-as
supportive of the notion that absent class members "may be parties for
some purposes and not for others." 15 Not so.
Careful analysis of the reasoning underlying these divergent
approaches to assessing the twin components of the diversity
jurisdiction statute reveals that the Supreme Court is not-in either
case-treating unnamed class members as parties joined in the action.
The diversity of citizenship rule for class actions-which is articulated
principally in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble-was an
application of the then-extant doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction; having
attained jurisdiction over the claim of a diverse class representative
against a defendant, a district court could exercise ancillary
jurisdiction over the claims of members of the class who were not
diverse from the defendant. 16 Turning to the amount-in-controversy
requirement for class actions, the rule against aggregating class
claims-announced in Snyder v. Harris--did not depend on the
conclusion that the absent class members were parties joined in the
action and thus their claims had to be assessed under existing non
aggregation rules. Rather, the Court indicated that once there is a
judgment for the entire class, the claims of absent class members will
be included in that judgment, which will mean that the "matter in
controversy" under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) "now encompasses all the
claims of the entire class," not just those of the named class
representative. 17 The Court then concluded that, although "it was in
14. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365-66 (1921). See
also Snyder, 394 U.S. at 340 ("Under current doctrine, if one member of a class is

of diverse citizenship from the class' opponent, and no nondiverse members are
named parties, the suit may be brought in federal court even though all other
members of the class are citizens of the same State as the defendant and have nothing
to fear from trying the lawsuit in the courts of their own State.").
15. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
16. 255 U.S. at 365 ("The right of the court to proceed to decree between the
appellants and the new parties [non-diverse unnamed class members] did not depend
upon difference of citizenship; because, the bill having been filed by the original
complainants on behalf of themselves and all other creditors choosing to come in
and share the expenses of the litigation, the court, in exercising jurisdiction between
the parties, could incidentally decree in favor of all other creditors coming in under
the bill. Such a proceeding would be ancillary to the jurisdiction acquired between
the original parties, and it would be merely a matter of form whether the new parties
should come in as co-complainants, or before a master, under a decree ordering a
reference to prove the claims of all persons entitled to the benefit of the decree."
(quoting Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885))).
17. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 337.
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joinder cases of this very kind that the doctrine that distinct claims
could not be aggregated was originally enunciated," there was
"certainly no reason to treat [class actions] differently from joined
actions for purposes of aggregation." 18
Thus, with respect to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court has
treated the claims of absent putative class members as follows:
( 1 }_There is ancillary jurisdiction over the claims of nondiverse absent
class members; and (2) the claims of class members to be included in
the judgment form part of the "matter in controversy" for purposes of
an analysis under § 1 332, requiring that each independently meet the
required amount in controversy. Congress disrupted this state of
affairs to some extent, of course, when it enacted the supplemental
jurisdiction statute-28 U.S.C. § 1 367. That statute embraced the idea
that there could be ancillary (now "supplemental") jurisdiction over
the claims of nondiverse class members but rejected the limitation
imposed by Snyder on the claims of class members not satisfying the
amount-in-controversy requirement of the diversity statute. Now,
supplemental jurisdiction is available for such claims. 1 9
In Devlin v. Scardelletti, the Court faced the question of
whether unnamed class members could appeal the approval of a class
settlement, given that they were not class representatives and had not
intervened in the suit. The Court concluded:
[N]onnamed class members are parties to the
proceedings in the sense of being bound by the
settlement. It is this feature of class action litigation
that requires that class members be allowed to appeal
the approval of a settlement when they have objected
at the fairness hearing. To hold otherwise would
deprive nonnamed class members of the power to
preserve their own interests in a settlement that will
ultimately bind them, despite their expressed
objections before the trial court.20

18. Id.
19. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 560 (2005)
(''Nothing in the text of § 1367(b), however, withholds supplemental jurisdiction
over the claims of plaintiffs . . . certified as class-action members pursuant to Rule
23 . . . . The natural, indeed the necessary, inference is that § 1367 confers
supplemental jurisdiction over claims by . . . Rule 23 plaintiffs.").
20. 536 U.S. at 10.
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But this was a limited holding recognizing the standing of absent class
members to challenge a settlement that would bind them as members
of the class and represent a final decision on their claims. The Court
did not thereby convert absent class members into named parties in the
litigation; rather, it indicated that "[w]e have never . . . restricted the
right to appeal to named parties to the litigation," and concluded that
unnamed class members do not have to be named parties in the action
to have the ability to appeal a final determination of their rights. 2 1
Devlin should not be read as an example of treating absent class
members as parties to the action or the litigation, but as the Court
extending to those members a right to appeal the approval of
settlements that will bind them. 22
How do these cases and other Supreme Court precedent inform
our understanding of the status of unnamed class members in the
personal jurisdiction context? No Supreme Court case regards absent
class members as parties joined in the action filed by a putative class
representative. 23 Indeed, "until certification there is no class action but
merely the prospect of one."24 This means that at the point of filing,
the action stands as one between the named class representatives and
the defendant named in the complaint; the claims of absent class
members are not yet before the court. It necessarily follows that when
detennining whether there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant
with respect to claims asserted by the named plaintiffs in a putative
class action, the only claims to be assessed by the court are those of
the class representatives. And that assessment is to be done in the

2 1 . Id. at 7.
22. This is not to say that the Devlin majority was correct in extending the right
of appeals to absent class members. The majority makes a sound policy argument
that given the inability to opt out of the settlement in what was a class action under
Rule 23(b)(l ), a right of appeal was the only means an unnamed class member had
to protect himself from being bound. Id. at 10. However, Justice Scalia, writing in
dissent, makes a compelling argument that absent class members may simply
intervene in the action to become parties and assert their right to appeal. Id. at 2223 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1 974) ("A
federal class action is no longer 'an invitation to joinder' but a truly representative
suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious
papers and motions."). See also FED. R. CN. P. 23(a)(l) (permitting a class action
"only if the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable")
(emphasis added).
24. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 72 1 F.3d 95, 1 12 n.22 (2d
Cir. 201 3) (quoting Morlan v. Universal Guar. Life Ins. Co., 298 F.3d 609, 616 (7th
Cir. 2002)).
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ordinary case under the auspices of Rule 4(k)( l )(A),2 5 which requires
that the federal district courts respect the Fourteenth Amendment due
process limitations imposed on the territorial reach of their respective
host states. 26
IL DETERMINING A COURT' S JURISDICTION OVER THE
CLAIMS OF ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS UPON CLASS
CERTIFICATION
Once a class is certified, the district court assumes-under
Rule 23-the ability to render a binding judgment with respect to all
members of that class as the court has defined it-named and
unnamed. This comports with the due process rights of the unnamed
class members because they are afforded notice of the action and the
ability to opt out of the class.27 The question is whether the defendant
retains any due process protections that are triggered by the
certification decision with respect to the claims of unnamed class
members. In other words, once the claims of absent class members
are certified and are now before the court for its authoritative
judgment, must that court be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendant for each of those claims?
Certainly, there is nothing more fundamental to judicial
authority than the principle that a court must have jurisdiction over a
defendant (and the subject matter of the dispute) to render a binding
judgment against it.28 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(l)(A); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125
(2014) ("Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their
jurisdiction over persons.") (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(l )(A)).
26. When the host jurisdiction is the District of Columbia, that concerns
jurisdiction in a federal enclave through courts whose actions are constrained by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the long-arm statute of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code § 13-423,
limits personal jurisdiction against non-residents based on claims arising out of
contacts with the District of Columbia, consistent with the constitutional limitations
imposed by the Fifth Amendment. Jackson v. George, 146 A.3d 405, 413 (D.C.
2016) ("This court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the transacting business provision
of the District's Long Arm Statute is coextensive with the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. In other words, the defendant must have minimum contacts with
theforum so that exercising personal jurisdiction over it would not offend traditional
notions offair play and substantial justice.") (emphasis added) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
27. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
28. Pen.noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) ("Since the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments
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Court indicated that a court adjudicating the claims of absent class
members has to have jurisdiction over those claims and that such
jurisdiction is constrained by due process. The issue the Shutts Court
faced was the nature of these due process constraints vis-a-vis
unnamed class members, not whether any due process constraints
existed at all. Thus, as to the foundational question of whether due
process supplies any limit on the ability of a court to render a binding
judgment with respect to absent class members or defendants who face
the claims of absent class members, the Supreme Court has indicated
that the answer is yes: "The Fourteenth Amendment does protect
'persons,' not 'defendants,' however, so absent plaintiffs as well as
absent defendants are entitled to some protection from the jurisdiction
of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their claims. "29
The more challenging questions are what is the specific source
and content of this protection that the Court has recognized?
Beginning with the source question first, because we are concerned
here with the jurisdictional reach of federal courts adjudicating class
actions, the only possibilities are (1) Rule 4(k)(l )(A) and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or (2) Rule 23 and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A. Rule 4(k)(J)(A)
Rule 4(k)(l)(A) would appear to have the strongest claim
because the territorial reach of federal district courts is tied by that
rule-and, derivatively, by the Fourteenth Amendment-to the reach
of their respective host states, unless there is an alternate provision of
Rule 4(k) that applies. 30 Those alternate provisions give a nod to the

may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground
that proceedings in a court ofjustice to determine the personal rights and obligations
of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of
law.").
29. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811.
30. Rule 4(k) supplies the applicable rule of personal jurisdiction in all cases
in federal district court, regardless of whether the court's subject matter jurisdiction
is based on diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Walden
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (applying Rule 4(k)(l)(A) to a Bivens action); Omni
Capital Int"! v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) ("Today, service of
process in a federal action is covered generally by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."). None of the analysis of the authority of federal district courts to
adjudicate the claims of unnamed class members depends on whether those claims
are based on state or federal law, except to the extent there is a federal law that
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ability of federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction on a broader
scale-to the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment-which requires only that a defendant have minimum
contacts with the United States as a whole. 3 1 Thus, a party joined under
Rule 1 4 or 19 served within 100 miles of the courthouse where the
action is pending (and within the United States) is subject to the
court's jurisdiction, regardless of whether that party has minimum
contacts with the forum state.32 When Congress authorizes nationwide
service of process in a federal statute, Rule 4(k)(l )(C) recognizes that
jurisdiction can be proper on that basis. 33 And if there is no state with
which the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts to support
personal jurisdiction in a federal question case, Rule 4(k)(2) permits
the federal court to exercise jurisdiction consistent with the limits of

authorizes personal jurisdiction on a nationwide basis. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 4(k)(l )(C).
31. See, e.g. , Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
("The only difference in the personal-jurisdiction analysis under the two
Amendments is the scope of relevant contacts: Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
which defines the reach of state courts, the relevant contacts are state-specific. Under
the Fifth Amendment, which defines the reach of federal courts, contacts with the
United States as a whole are relevant."); see also Republic of Panama v. BCCI
Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 946--47 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[A] defendant's
contacts with the forum state play no magical role in the Fifth Amendment analysis
. . . . Thus, determining whether litigation imposes an undue burden on a litigant
cannot be determined by evaluating only a defendant's contacts with the forum state.
A court must therefore examine a defendant's aggregate contacts with the nation as
a whole rather than his contacts with the forwn state in conducting the Fifth
Amendment analysis." (footnote omitted)); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers
v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Constitution
requires only that the defendant have the requisite 'minimum contacts' with the
United States, rather than with the particular forum state . . . ."); United States v. De
Ortiz, 910 F.2d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1990) (indicating that Fifth Amendment due
process is satisfied where the defendant has "sufficient contacts with the United
States as a whole rather than any particular state or other geographic area"). The
scope of territorial jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment is discussed generally in
A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach ofFederal Courts,71 FLA. L. REV. 979
(2019).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(l )(B). Rule 4(k)(l )(B) limits its reach to service
"within a judicial district of the United States" because service outside of the United
States-regardless of whether such service occurred within 100 miles of a federal
district courthouse-would not be able to establish jurisdiction consistent with the
limits of the Fifth Amendment, which requires minimum contacts with (and thus
service inside of) the United States.
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(l)(C).
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the Constitution-which are the Fifth Amendment' s due process
constraints. 34
However, in the class action context, none of the other
provisions of Rule 4(k) are relevant. The claims of absent class
members are not before the court at the outset of the action when
service is made and those members are not joined in the action under
Rule 14 or 1 9, making Rule 4(k)(l )(B) inapplicable. Neither is there
a federal statute that authorizes nationwide service of process for class
actions, making Rule 4(k)(l )(C) inapplicable. Rule 4(k)(2)'s provision
has no relevance to class actions asserting state law claims and is
ordinarily not available due to the amenability of most defendants to
specific jurisdiction in a particular U.S. state. It would seem, then, that
Rule 4(k) ( l)(A) remains the virtually only rule setting forth the
jurisdictional reach of a district court presented with a class action.
It is certainly true that Rule 4(k)(l)(A) is the relevant rule
governing the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant for
the claims of named class representatives, as those are the claims
included in the complaint that is served with the summons on the
defendant. At that time, the claims of unnamed class members-as
discussed above-are not before the court. Once the court certifies a
class that includes the claims of absent class members, however, that
is when the due process constraints on a court's authority over
unnamed class members and their claims against the defendant come
into play. 35 But practice under Rule 23 does not require that the
summons and complaint be re-served on the defendant once a class is
certified. Does this mean that there is technically no vehicle through
which Rule 4(k)(l)(A) may be reapplied to govern the territorial reach
of the court over the claims of absent class members now subject to its
judgment?
The Appellees in Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. v. Molock
certainly thought so, making this argument both in their brief and at
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
3 5. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) ("The
Fourteenth Amendment does protect 'persons,' not ' defendants,' however, so absent
plaintiffs as well as absent defendants are entitled to some protection from the
jurisdiction of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their claims."). See also
William Rubenstein, 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 6:26 (5th ed.) ("If the class
prevails in the case, the goal is a binding judgment over the defendant as to the
claims of the entire nationwide class-and the deprivation of the defendant's
property accordingly. Such a proposed class-wide deprivation triggers a defendant's
right to class-wide due process, that is, its right to ensure the requisite territorial
connection between it and the court as to the full scope of its liability.").
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oral argument before the D.C. Circuit.36 But this is pure nonsense.
Once a defendant has appeared in a case in response to the original
service of the complaint, all subsequent pleadings are served on the
defendant under Rule 5 (a)(l ). 37 This means, for example, that an
amended pleading asserting new claims need not be re-served under
Rule 4.38 There is no question that-notwithstanding that such
amended complaints are not served with a summons under Rule 4new claims appearing in amended complaints must satisfy the
jurisdictional constraints imposed by Rule 4(k); courts regularly apply
Rule 4(k)(l )(A) limitations to the claims appearing in amended
complaints. 39 It would be preposterous to suggest that because
amended complaints are served under Rule 5 they may evade the
restrictions applicable to claims contained within complaints served
under Rule 4, subject only to the limits of the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause. Were such the case, the ability to amend would
provide a gaping loophole to the ordinary territorial restrictions on
federal court jurisdiction that Rule 4(k) imposes.
Counsel for the Appellee in Mussat v. IQVIA Inc. attempted to
make this point at oral argument before the Seventh Circuit, but was
rebuffed by the judges of the panel, who argued that Rule 4(k)(l )(A)
was applicable to claims added by amendment because the original
named plaintiff-who served the summons and complaint under Rule
4-was the party asserting the new claims.40 What should have been
pointed out to the panel is that when a plaintiff amends its complaint
to add new plaintiffs under Rule 20, or when new plaintiffs intervene
in an action under Rule 24, neither of these parties is required to serve
36. Corrected Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 33 n.9, Whole Foods 11kt. Grp.,
Inc. v. Molock (No. 18-7162), (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2019) ("Service of process on the
defendant by unnamed class members has never been required under Rule 4, Rule
23, or any other law. Rule 4 therefore does not limit federal courts' jurisdiction over
unnamed class members' claims.").
37. FED. R. Crv. P. 5(a)( l )(B) (providing for service of "a pleading filed after
the original complaint" in accordance with the various methods identified in Rule
5(b)).
38. See, e.g., Emp. Painters' Tr. v. Ethan Enters., Inc., 480 F.3d 993, 999 (9th
Cir. 2007) ("Although the parties and the district court assumed- for reasons not
explained-that Rule 4 governed service of the amended complaint, that is not so.
Instead, it is Rule 5 that was applicable.").
39. See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700-01 (7th Cir. 2010)
(applying Rule 4(k)(l )(A) to determine the ability of the district court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over claims asserted in a "Sixth Amended Complaint").
40. Oral Argument at 27:53-28:00, Mussat v. IQVIA Inc. (7th Cir. Sept. 27,
2019) (No. 19-1204), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2019/pr.19-1204.19l204_09_27_2019.mp3.
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process on the defendant under Rule 4. Instead, their claims are
introduced in the action either through an amendment under Rule 1 5
(adding a plaintiff under Rule 20) or a motion to intervene under Rule
24, both of which are communicated to the defendant under the
auspices of Rule 5, 4 1 not Rule 4. 42 Notwithstanding that, the personal
jurisdiction limitations of the district court that are imposed by Rule
4(k) remain the operative constraints that district courts apply to these
new claims by newly joined parties. It thus cannot be gainsaid that the
territorial reach of federal courts over claims added to the action after
the initial service of the summons is defined by Rule 4(k), even though
none of those claims are served on defendants under Rule 4. It follows,
then, that if there is any regulatory source of the territorial limits on a
fe deral district court's authority to adjudicate the claims of absent
members of a certified class in a way that binds defendants, it must
emanate from Rule 4(k).
B. Rule 23 and the Fifth Amendment
Indeed, no other plausible candidate for the source of such
jurisdictional constraints can be found. It cannot be that Rule 23 itself
provides the relevant jurisdictional rule. Nothing in the language of
the rule addresses the personal jurisdiction of district courts over the
claims of absent class members included in a certified class. As a rule
of procedure promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act (REA), 43
41. FED. R. Crv. P. 5 (indicating that "a pleading filed after the original
complaint" may be served by any of the methods enumerated in Rule 5(b); FED. R.
Crv. P. 24(c) ("A motion to intervene must be served
on the parties as provided in Rule 5."). See also, e.g. , Bonita Packing Co. v.
O'Sullivan, 165 F.R.D. 610, 612-13 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("A federal court does not
have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served properly . . .
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. . . . A summons and complaint in intervention, however, may
be served in accordance with Rule 5(b) . . . ."). Rule 24(c) has abrogated the
understanding that the Supreme Court had prior to the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that intervening plaintiffs must serve their claims on
defendants in accord with ordinary requirements of service of process. See In re
Ind. Transp. Co., 244 U.S. 456, 458 (1917) (Holmes, J.) ("The new claimants are
strangers and must begin their action by service just as if no one had sued the
defendant before.").
42. See, e.g. , Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., No. 05-2093-JWL-DJW,
2006 WL 8429267, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 3, 2006) ("[T]he Court finds joinder of the
proposed plaintiffs under Rule 20(a) is appropriate; thus, Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend Complaint is granted. Plaintiff shall electronically file and serve the First
Amended Complaint . . . .") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
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Rule 23 is a procedural device that merely "allows willing plaintiffs to
join their separate claims against the same defendants in a class action
. . . . [L]ike traditional joinder, it leaves the parties' legal rights and
duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged. "44
Additionally, because Rule 4(k) expressly addresses the
territorial reach of federal courts, there is no warrant for federal courts
to read into Rule 23 a federal common law rule permitting a kind of
pendent party personal jurisdiction45-limited only by the national
contacts constraints imposed by the Fifth Amendment46-over the
claims of unnamed class members to effectuate the purposes of Rule
23. Although, in another context, the Court has read into Rule 23 the
ability to toll the running of applicable limitations periods for absent
class members subsequently choosing to pursue their claims
individually,47 this was an articulation of an equitable tolling rule in
the absence of any language in Rule 23 or elsewhere that addressed
the matter. The authority of federal courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over defendants is not an analogous setting. Given the
provisions addressing jurisdiction in several distinct circumstances in
Rule 4(k)-none of which explicitly speak of class actions-and the
failure of Congress to enact a nationwide service-of-process provision
for class actions, it would be inappropriate for the Court to read Rule
23 to contain such a provision by implication; expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. As the Court aptly put it in Omni Capital
International, Ltd. v. Rudolph Wolff & Co. , when confronted with a
request to imply nationwide jurisdiction into Section 22 of the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA):
Section 22, however, is silent as to service of process.
This contrasts sharply with the other enforcement
44. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
408 (2010) (Scalia,J.). See generally A. Benjamin Spencer,Substance, Procedure,
and the Rules Enabling Act, 66 UCLA L. REV. 654 (2019) (discussing the limits
imposed on rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act).
45. The contemporary doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction as embraced
by the circuit courts is that "where a federal statute authorizes nationwide service of
process, and the federal and state-law claims derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact, the district court may assert personal jurisdiction over the parties to
the related state-law claims even if personal jurisdiction is not otherwise available."
Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank ofAm. Corp.,883 F.3d 68,88 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting
IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann,9 F.3d 1049, 1056 (2d Cir. 1993)).
46. See supra note 31 (citing cases articulating the national contacts standard
applicable under the Fifth Amendment).
47. Am. Pipe& Constr. Co. v. Utah,414 U.S. 538 (1974).

46

THE REVIEW OF LITIGA TION

[Vol. 39: 1

provisions of the CEA, on which Omni asks us to rely.
We find it significant that Congress expressly provided
for nationwide service of process in those sections but
did not do so in the new § 22. It would appear that
Congress knows how to authorize nationwide service
of process when it wants to provide for it. That
Congress failed to do so here argues forcefully that
such authorization was not its intention. 48
Further, even if implying a nationwide jurisdictional reach on
a pendent personal jurisdiction theory were permissible, 49 it could not
be justified by a need to effectuate the policy behind Rule 23 of
facilitating class actions. U.S.-based defendants will always be suable
in their home jurisdictions. 5 ° Foreign defendants can be sued by
classes in federal courts located in those states with which they have
minimum contacts, and then those actions can be subsequently
consolidated and transferred to a single district under the multidistrict
litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, if the respective classes raise
common questions of fact. 51 Nationwide jurisdiction in every federal
48. 484 U.S. 97, 106 (1987).
49. Note that the Supreme Court expressly rejected the attempt to permit a state
court to exercise pendent party personal jurisdiction over claims unconnected with
the forum in Bristol-Myers Squibb:
As we have explained, "a defendant's relationship with a . . . third party, standing
alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction." This remains true even when third
parties (here,the plaintiffs who reside in California) can bring claims similar to those
brought by the nonresidents. Nor is it sufficient-or even relevant-that BMS
conducted research in California on matters unrelated to Plavix. What is needed
and what is missing here-is a connection between the forum and the specific claims
at issue.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781
(2017) (citation omitted).
50. Daimler AG v. Bauman,571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) ("When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred
to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings."). Personal
jurisdiction is not ordinarily a problem for a transferee court receiving actions from
other federal districts under § 1407 (the MDL statute). See In re FMC Corp. Patent
Litig., 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 1976) ("Transfers under Section 1407 are
simply not encumbered by considerations of in personamjurisdiction and venue. . . .
Following a transfer, the transferee judge has all the jurisdiction and powers over
pretrial proceedings in the actions transferred to him that the transferorjudge would
have had in the absence of transfer."). See also Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics,Inc.,
382 F. App'x 437,442 (6th Cir. 2010) ("The MDL statute (28 U.S.C. § 1407) is, in
fact, legislation ' authorizing the federal courts to exercise nationwide personal
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district is hardly necessary to vindicate the interests of Rule 23. If
these vehicles for asserting class actions are deemed by Congress to
be insufficient, it well knows how to remedy the situation through
legislation5 2 or a direct revision of the Federal Rules. 53
C.

The Fourteenth Amendment Standard

Now that we have established that there must be personal
jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to the claims of absent class
members, and that Rule 4(k) determines the scope of a federal district
court's jurisdictional reach over such claims, stating the content of the
standard that courts must use to guide their jurisdictional analysis is
straightforward. The Fourteenth Amendment's due process
constraints-made operative in federal court by Rule 4(k)(l)(A)
"limit[] the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment
against a nonresident defendant."54 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed that this limitation means--outside the general jurisdiction
context-"there must be 'an affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that
takes place in the forum State"'55 and is therefore subject to the State's
regulation. More directly, the Court has stated that "[i]n order for a
state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, 'the suit ' must 'aris[e] out
of or relat[ e] to the defendant's contacts with the forum. "'5 6
Although the Court has also emphasized that "a variety of
interests" are relevant to the specific jurisdiction analysis-with the
"primary concern" being "the burden on the defendant"-these
jurisdiction."') (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 163
(2d Cir. 1987)).
52. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (providing for nationwide service of process in
statutory interpleader actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1335). See also, e.g. , 15 U.S.C. §
22 (Clayton Act) ("[A]ll process in such cases may be served in the district of which
it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.").
53. If an alternate jurisdictional rule were desired for class actions, the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee, or Congress, could amend Rule 4(k) by adding the
following language to what would become Rule 4(k.)(3):
(3) Claims of Unnamed Class Members. For claims asserted by unnamed members
of a class action, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant if exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United
States Constitution and laws.
54. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v . Woodson, 444 U.S. 2 86, 291 (1980).
55. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1781 (2017) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)).
56. Id. at 1780 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)).
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considerations cannot control the analysis because "restrictions on
personal jurisdiction . . . 'are a consequence of territorial limitations
on the power of the respective States. "' 57 As a result, as stated recently
by the Court in Bristol-Myers,
[E]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the
tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy;
even if the forum State is the most convenient location
for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act
to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.5 8
This understanding has characterized the Court's modern personal
jurisdiction doctrine from its inception, as it has held that the Due
Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make binding
a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. "59
Applying these "settled principles" to the claims of absent,
unnamed class members leads inevitably to the conclusion that to the
extent such claims are unconnected with the defendant's forum state
contacts, contemporary understandings of the Fourteenth
Amendment's constraints on state power prevent that forum from
rendering a binding, in personam judgment against the defendant on
those claims. When there is confessedly no link between the claims of
nonresident, absent class members and the defendant's contacts with
the forum state, that forum may not exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendant with respect to those claims based merely on the
defendant's relationship with third parties whose claims are connected
with the forum, regardless of how similar those claims are to those
brought by nonresidents. That, of course, is the core holding of Bristo/
Myers. Given that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
constraints are the operative limitations on a federal district court's
5 7. Id. (quoting World- Wide Volkswagen,444 U.S. at 292; Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
5 8. Id. at 1780-81 (quoting World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294). It is
this power component of the due process constraint on a court's territorial authority
that undermines any attempt to rely on the certification requirements of Rule 23 as
sufficient to protect the due process rights of defendants.
59. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of unnamed class members, the
Bristol-Myers Court's interpretation thereof and the result it compels
cannot be circumvented or otherwise avoided.
III. APPLYING THE CONSTRAINT: HOW COURTS MAY
ENFORCE THE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR TERRITORIAL
REACH OVER THE CLAIMS OF ABSENT CLASS
MEMBERS
Concluding that a federal court may adjudicate the claims of
unnamed class members against nonresident defendants only if those
claims are connected with the defendants'' forum contacts does not
resolve how this limitation is to be enforced. We return to the
previously established proposition that at the outset of an action, a
complaint filed by a plaintiff proposing to proceed on behalf of a
putative class has not yet brought those claims before the court. This
means that although the defendant may file a motion under Rule
12(b)(2) to dismiss the claims of the named class representative for a
lack of personal jurisdiction if warranted by the facts, 60 the defendant
may not move to dismiss the claims of absent members of a putative,
proposed class referenced in the complaint. A corollary of this
principle is that a defendant's failure to seek the dismissal of the
claims of absent members of a putative class in conformity with the
consolidation and forfeiture principles imposed by Rule 12(h)6 1 will
not constitute a waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense for those
claims.62
Instead, the limits on the court's territorial jurisdiction must be
factored into the court's determination of the definition of the class it
will certify under Rule 23.63 In the face of an objection to the court's
60. See, e.g., Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1 14,
1 26 (D.D.C. 20 1 8) (granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 1 2(b)(2) for lack of
personal jurisdiction with respect to claims asserted by two named class
representatives).
6 1 . FED. R. CN. P. 12(h)(l ) (providing that personal jurisdiction defenses are
waived if not raised by motion under Rule 1 2 or in a responsive pleading filed in the
absence of any Rule 12 motions).
62. This conclusion means that the decision of the district court in Cruson v.
Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 4 : 1 6-CV-009 12, 201 8 WL 293747 1 (E.D. Tex. June
12, 201 8)-in which it held that the defendant waived its personal jurisdiction
challenge by failing to raise the challenge via a motion to dismiss before the class
certification determination-was in error and should be reversed by the Fifth Circuit.
63. FED. R. CN. P. 23(c)(l)(B).
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jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members having claims
that are unconnected to the forum, the court should engage in the
jurisdictional analysis called for by Bristol-Myers and exclude from
the definition of the class those claims that cannot meet that
constitutional standard. In the absence of such an objection, a court is
under no obligation to exclude such claims sua sponte because the
personal jurisdiction objection may be waived. 64 To the extent the
court-over the defendant's objection-certifies a class that includes
the claims of absent class members that do not meet the applicable
Fourteenth Amendment due process constraints, the defendant may
seek an appeal of the certification decision6 5 or seek to alter or amend
the class definition66 on this ground.
However, a defendant need not await the certification
determination to raise personal jurisdiction problems for the claims of
absent class members. Although, as previously indicated, a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction would be out of order with
respect to such claims at the outset when only a putative class is being
proposed, it would very much be in order for a defendant to seek to
excise allegations from a complaint that purport to include unnamed
class members having non-forum-connected claims within the
definition of the class. The mechanism for doing so is the motion to
strike under Rule 12(f). 67 A court may strike from a plaintiff's
pleading any allegations that are without basis and for which there can
be no recovery, particularly when retaining the allegations would be
prejudicial to the defendant. 6 8 Given that a court will ultimately be
unable to adjudicate the claims of unnamed class members that are
unconnected with the forum based on a lack of personal jurisdiction
(if that deficiency is properly raised by the defendant), retaining those
64. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) ("[N]either
personal jurisdiction nor venue is fundamentally preliminary in the sense that
subject-matter jurisdiction is, for both are personal privileges of the defendant, rather
than absolute strictures on the court, and both may be waived by the parties.").
65. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f).
66. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(l )(C).
6 7. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(f).
68. See, e.g.,""; Mussat v. IQVIA Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018) ("Courts will strike pleadings that are insufficient as a
matter of law, meaning they bear no relation to the controversy or would prejudice
the movant.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Delta
Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009)
("The court may either strike on its own or on a motion by a party and has
considerable discretion in striking any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or
scandalous matter.").
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allegations in the complaint, when they cannot be properly included in
the definition of the certified class, would be to keep "immaterial" and
"impertinent" matter in the action.
This is the very approach taken by the judge in Mussat v.
IQVIA Inc.69-a case recently appealed to the Seventh Circuit. That
court would be well advised to affirm. Regarding the decision of the
district court in Molock v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., which
rejected the jurisdictional challenge to the non-forum-connected
claims of unnamed class members, the D.C. Circuit could affirm the
denial of the motion to dismiss-given that it was premature-and
remand with guidance that the district court may either entertain a
motion to strike the allegations pertaining to unconnected claims of
unnamed putative class members or revisit the issue when making the
class certification and class definition determination. In so doing, the
D.C. Circuit should announce that the standards of Bristol-Myers must
be applied to such claims when properly raised on remand. An
alternate approach if it is seen as futile to remand if these claims will
face certain death, would be for the D.C. Circuit to construe the
defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion to strike instead, and hold
that the motion to strike should be granted based on Bristol-Myers.
CONCLUSION
In Bristol-Myers, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the
question of "whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same
restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal
court." 70 Although the Fifth Amendment permits federal courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction on a nationwide basis, 7 1 federal courts
are not able to exercise the jurisdiction that the Fifth Amendment
would permit when they are operating under Rule 4(k)(l)(A). Until
either Rule 4(k) or Rule 23 is revised-preferably by Congress-to
provide for personal jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class
members not arising out of contacts with the forum, or until Congress
enacts legislation to the same effect, the due process protections that
class action defendants enjoy in federal court are those of the

69. 2018 WL 5311903, at *l .
70. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1784 (2017).
71. See Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) ("Congress
could provide for service of process anywhere in the United States.") See also cases
cited supra in note 31.
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Fourteenth Amendment, by operation of Rule 4(k)(l )(A). Those
protections are those announced in Bristol-Myers. 72

72. The Seventh Circuit panel appeared to find it alarming that this 'newly
discovered rule' from Bristol-Myers would disrupt what it perceived to be decades
of settled presumptions regarding jurisdiction over class actions. It is hardly unusual
for Supreme Court pronouncements to have such an effect. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overturning Swift v. Tyson after a more than 100year reign); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011) (limiting general jurisdiction to cases where the defendant may be considered
"at home" despite decades of circuit precedent permitting general personal
jurisdiction beyond that context in fora where a defendant's contacts were simply
"continuous and systematic").

